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ABSTRACT 
Mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) are well known to be vulnerable 
to various attacks, due to features such as lack of centralized control, 
dynamic topology, limited physical security and energy constrained 
operations. In this paper we focus on preventing denial-of-service 
(DoS) attacks. As an example, we consider intruders that can cause 
DoS by exploiting the route discovery procedure of reactive routing 
protocols.  We show the unsuitability of tools such as control chart, 
used in statistical process control (SPC), to detect DoS and propose 
an anomaly-based intrusion detection system that uses a combination 
of chi-square test & control chart to first detect intrusion and then 
identify an intruder. When the intruder is isolated from the network 
we show reduced overhead and increased throughput. Simulation 
results show that AIDP performs well at an affordable processing 
overhead over the range of scenarios tested.   
Categories and Subject Descriptors                     
D.2 [Computer-Communication Networks]:                          
Wireless communication, Security and protection. 
General Terms 
 Security, Algorithms. 
Keywords 
 Ad-hoc network security, intrusion detection & prevention. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
MANETs have a decentralized architecture and lack of centralized 
control; consequently, mechanisms that enforce security present a 
particular challenge. In fixed networks, intrusion detection and 
prevention (IDP) [1] acts as a second layer of defence beyond a 
firewall; whereas in MANETs IDP becomes the front line of defence 
to protect nodes from attacks. There are two ID techniques known as 
misuse-based intrusion detection (MBID) and anomaly-based 
intrusion detection (ABID). MBID maintains a knowledge base 
containing signatures or patterns of known attacks and looks for these 
patterns in an attempt to detect them. MBID has a potentially low 
false detection rate but it can only detect attacks whose signatures are 
in the database. On the other hand ABID can flag observed activities 
that deviate significantly from the established normal profile. ABID 
not only provides early warnings of potential intrusions but also can 
detect attempts to exploit new and unforeseen vulnerabilities; 
however it is more prone to generate false positives than MBID.         
Routing protocols in MANETs are generally classified as either 
proactive or reactive. Proactive routing protocols such as DSDV and  
 
 
 
 
WRP are not efficient because of their routing traffic overhead and 
therefore reactive routing protocols such as AODV and DSR are most 
frequently used in MANETs. However, both AODV and DSR 
operate on the assumption that all nodes in the network can trust each 
other and there are no malicious intruder nodes. This is not true in all 
cases, and therefore we believe that there is a need to use an IDP 
system to provide secure routing in MANETs. In this paper we 
illustrate how intruders can exploit the route discovery procedure of 
reactive routing protocol to cause certain DoS attacks in MANET. 
We then look at the detection of DoS; we assess control chart, a tool 
used in statistical process control (SPC)[2] and show that it generate 
low detection & high false alarm rates. We therefore consider a two 
stage process: we employ the chi-square goodness of fit test [3] as an 
ABID mechanism to initially check the overall behaviour of the 
network and indicate intrusion; in the event of a positive result we 
then use control chart to identify intruding nodes. Finally we isolate 
the nodes from the network to prevent intrusion. We call our 
algorithm Adaptive Intrusion Detection & Prevention (AIDP).   
Section 2 of this paper describes related research & challenges in ID 
and securing MANETs. Section 3 describes DoS attacks and 
indicates how an intruder can cause DoS in MANETs. Section 4 
presents our proposed algorithm. Simulations and their result are 
illustrated in Section 5. We summarize our results and future work in 
Section 6. 
2. RELATED RESEARCH & CHALLENGES 
2.1 Securing MANETs 
SEAD was proposed in [4] as a secure routing protocol that uses a 
one-way hash function to provide authentication for the proactive 
routing protocol DSDV. The secure routing mechanism ARAN was 
proposed in [5]. A similar approach Ariadne [6] has been proposed 
for end-to-end authentication based on shared key pairs. These 
methods provide authenticated routing & ensure integrity of routing 
information mainly to prevent routing attacks caused by modification 
of control packets or forged routing information. However, a 
MANET node can, without modifying any control packets exploit the 
route discovery procedure of reactive routing protocols to cause DoS 
attacks as we describe below in section 3. 
Wang, Lu and Bhargava [7] performed a vulnerability analysis 
of AODV in which they observed that on-demand route queries 
enable real time attacks. Some researchers have proposed methods to 
detect this: for example Ping and Zhang [8] considered a route 
request (RREQ) flooding attack in MANETs. They proposed a 
RREQ flooding prevention mechanism based on neighbour’s 
supervision that maintains a priority queue of the incoming RREQs. 
This mechanism reduces the priority of RREQ generated by a specific 
node if a higher rate of incoming queries from that particular node is 
observed. However in some applications of MANETs there can be 
specific nodes that generate more traffic; for example, in on-the-fly 
networks formed for a seminar and yet Ping & Zhang’s method will 
remove requests from the queue above a certain incoming request rate 
in all cases.  In another example Yu and Ray [9] defined two types of 
injecting traffic attack in MANETs as query and data packets 
flooding. They detect the attack if requests are made a certain number 
of times in t sec. These methods are based on static thresholds to 
detect malicious RREQ flooding which in our opinion does not cope 
well with the dynamically changing environment of MANETs. In 
addition, there is also the need to address the issue of isolating a node 
once it is detected as an attacker.  
2.2 Intrusion Detection 
ID in MANETs is more challenging than in fixed networks because 
the former lack a concentration point where traffic can be analyzed, 
and because of their dynamically changing topology and limited 
computational ability of nodes. Zhang and Lee argue [10] that many 
ID techniques developed for fixed wired networks are not applicable 
in MANETs and they proposed an ID and response mechanism in 
which an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) agent performs local data 
collection and local detection. They then trigger a cooperative 
detection and global response when a node reports an intrusion. 
Nguyen et al. [11] proposed ID through a statistical anomaly 
detection approach called Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
which is used as an outlier detector method for high speed fixed 
networks. Ye et al. [12] used a probabilistic technique for anomaly 
detection in fixed networks. They investigated audit data by using 
various probabilistic techniques including decision tree, Hotelling’s 
T2 test, chi-square test and Markov chain for detecting intrusion into 
the information system on fixed networks and concluded that chi–
square test based on frequency property provides good ID 
performance. Ye and Chen [13] also proposed an anomaly detector 
based on the chi-square test for detecting intrusion in fixed networks. 
They concluded that the results demonstrate promising performance 
in terms of high detection and low false alarm rate. The chi-square 
test has been successfully used for ABID in fixed network but in a 
MANET where there is no existing knowledge of normal behaviour 
we have extra challenges to apply these ABID techniques. 
3. DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS 
DoS is an attempt to make resources or services unavailable to their 
intended users. Distributed DoS is a severe threat for MANETs 
because they can be crashed due to their limited battery power or 
their network can easily become congested due to its relatively 
limited bandwidth compared to fixed networks. Some examples of 
DoS attack on reactive routing protocol such as AODV and DSR are 
as follows: 
        Sleep Deprivation: here [14] the attacker interacts with the node 
in a manner that appears to be legitimate; however the purpose of 
interaction is to keep the victim node out of its power conserving 
sleep mode. An intruder can cause sleep deprivation by exploiting the 
vulnerability of the route discovery process of protocols such as 
AODV and DSR, for example, by sending a RREQ packet 
periodically so that the victim node has to process these packets 
causing exhaustion of its battery power. 
Rushing Attack:  In order to limit the control packet overhead an 
on-demand protocol only requires nodes to forward the first RREQ 
that arrives for each route discovery. An intruder can exploit this 
property by spreading RREQ packets quickly throughout the network 
so as to suppress any later legitimate RREQ packets [15].                 
In the work described in this paper we have initially considered 
vulnerabilities in AODV but AIDP can be applied to other routing 
protocols. 
3.1 Vulnerabilities in AODV 
AODV is designed for use in networks where the nodes can all trust 
other nodes and can assume there is no malicious intruder node. 
Considering the operation of AODV [16], specifically its route 
discovery process, it is highly vulnerable to DoS attacks such as sleep 
deprivation and the rushing attack. In the route discovery procedure 
of AODV when a node needs a route to a destination, it broadcasts a 
RREQ packet containing a broadcast id, source & destination 
addresses, hop count and destination sequence number. After 
broadcasting a node is required to wait for a specific time for a RREP 
or other control packet. The node may try again once this time 
expires. The source node is expected to use an expanding ring search 
technique for controlled dissemination of RREQs in the network. 
This means that after sending a RREQ with Time to Live (TTL) field 
set to one the node can resend the RREQ with an incremented TTL 
value after waiting for ring traversal time. The node can repeat this 
process until either a RREP or route error is received or the TTL 
value reaches its maximum value. After that the node can retry the 
same path discovery for a specific destination up to some defined 
maximum number of RREQ retries. 
 
3.2 Malicious RREQ Flooding  
We initially focus on malicious RREQ flooding (MRF) which can 
cause DoS attacks such as sleep derivation & rushing attack in 
MANETs. In MRF an intruder exploits the route discovery process of 
a reactive routing protocol such as AODV to cause DoS in the 
network. An intruder can flood the network with malicious RREQs 
without being detected by other nodes in the following ways:  
Malicious RREQ Flooding 1:  an intruder broadcasts a RREQ with 
a destination IP address that is within the domain but does not exist. 
This will compel all nodes to forward this RREQ because no-one will 
have the route for this destination IP address. 
Malicious RREQ Flooding 2:  after broadcasting a RREQ an 
intruder does not wait for the ring traversal time and continues 
resending the RREQ for same destination with higher TTL value. 
4. AIDP 
We now describe AIDP, which uses ABID to detect DoS attacks 
caused by MRF in MANETs. AIDP consists of two modules: a 
training and a testing module as explained later in this section. 
4.1 Model Assumptions & Terminologies 
We disregard attacks aimed at the physical and link layers.  We 
consider applications of MANETs formed on-the-fly for group 
collaboration such as rescue operations or seminars. We note that an 
ABID requires data of only normal activities containing audit traces 
and traffic patterns of normal events to build a training profile. 
However, in contrast with fixed networks, data resources such as [17] 
that reflect normal activities or events are not available for on-the-fly 
MANETs applications. In general the normal operation of MANETs 
is not known. Therefore we assume that the initial behaviour of the 
network formed on-the-fly during the training phase is free from 
anomalies. To illustrate the implementation of AIDP we assume a 
clustered MANET organization. We select the most capable nodes in 
terms of their processing abilities as cluster head (CH) and the others 
nodes becomes cluster nodes (CN). At present we assume secure 
communication between CH and CNs.  
       The operation of AIDP is illustrated in Fig.1. When the network 
is established, the CH continuously gathers information and applies 
the AIDP training module for N time intervals (TI), resulting in an 
initial training profile (ITP). The ITP reflects the normal behaviour of 
the nodes in the network. In the testing phase the CH then applies the  
  
testing module after each TI. This test consists of several tasks, the 
first of which detects intrusion. If there is no intrusion then it updates 
the ITP in order to adapt the variation in the network behaviour as 
time progresses. If there is intrusion in the second task the CH 
identifies the intruding nodes. To optimise the probability of 
identifying intruders correctly with a low level of false positives, it 
maintains a test sliding window (TSW), in which d detections of a 
node are required in P time intervals (TI). If this detection threshold 
is passed then the CH will Blacklist (BL) the node and isolate the 
node by informing all CNs. 
4.2 AIDP Algorithm 
We now explain the training and testing module of AIDP. 
Training Module:  
While i is less than equal to N 
     .CH collects the number of RREQ received X i by CN 
       from all other CNs taking into account TTL values in TI. 
     . Calculate the probability distribution P( X i) 
    end while 
    .calculate mean iX  of P(X i) for i=1 to N 
    .Store results as ITF. 
    . Exit 
 
In Fig.2 Xi ={X1, X2, X3,…,XM} is a set of random variables 
representing the number of RREQs received by all CNs  in the ith TI, 
where M is the maximum number of RREQs received in a TI. This 
includes both the RREQ packets generated by the source nodes and 
those RREQ packets forwarded by intermediate nodes. The 
probability distribution of Xi is calculated for the TI, and this process 
is then repeated for the N time intervals in the training phase. We 
then calculate mean iX  of P(Xi) for N intervals, which is stored as 
an ITP containing the expected values for that particular network 
observed for the total time of N*TI seconds. The training module 
pseudocode can of course be generalized to collect other parameters. 
Testing Module: 
a) Detecting Intrusion & Calling other Modules 
.CH sets TSW to P number of TI 
      .CH Monitor the network for TI 
     Do after each TI  
     . CH collects  number of RREQ received X i  from all other CNs  in TI. 
     . Calculate the probability distribution P(X i) 
     .Calculate average of P(X i)  
     .Store X i as Observed values. 
    . End do 
    .CH Applies the chi-square test by first Calculating Chi computed (
2χ ) 
     .Hypothesis Testing  
      Ho: Observed distribution of Xi  fits the expected      
         Ha: Observed distribution of Xi does not fit expected      
      .If (chi-computed (.d.f) > P-value (.d.f))  then 
           Reject Ho & call: LND= Intruder-Identification(nodes Vi) 
        For all nodes Vi  in LND (List of Nodes Detected) 
            . If ( Vi  detections in PIL > Detections_To_ Accuse) 
           CH: Blacklist Vi & Broadcast AccusationPacket(AP)        
         else :     enter Vi  in PIL 
        endif.  else :   Update Expected values  iX (TP) 
     .endif  
     .Exit 
b)	




     .calculate RREQ generated by Vi   for i=1 to n (n=number of nodes) 
     .calculate standard deviation  of Vi 
        .set Contol Line (CL) 
     .set Upper Control Limit (UCL) &  lower control limit(LCL) 
     For   Vi     i= 1 to n  
       If (RREQ generated by Vi  )> UCL 
          add  Vi  to LND 
      . endif 
     .endfor  
     .return (LND) &  Exit  
c) 


      . each CN Vi  maintain its local BlacklistTable (BLT) 
      .if CN  Vi  receive an AP for CN Vj 
        .If CN  Vi  has node  Vj   in its BLT 
          Ignore AP 
        else  
          CN add node Vj   to its   BLT  &   rebroadcast AP  
       .endif 
      .endif    
d)


       .if node  Vi  receive packet  from  node Vj 
        .If node  Vj  is in  node  Vi   BLT 
            Ignore packet & drop all packet queued from Vj 
         Else :    handle  &  process packet  
        .endif 
       .endif
 
Fig.3 shows the pseudocode of the testing module. After monitoring 
the network for one TI, the CH uses the chi-square test to identify any 
intrusion. This test determines how well the observed model fits with 
the expected. 
2
2
1
( )N
i i
i i
X X
X
χ
=
−
=                         
Equation 1 is the specific form of the test in which Xi is the observed 
and iX  is the expected value of the ith variable. After calculating the 
chi-computed value the CH performs hypothesis testing by setting the 
null hypothesis Ho and alternative hypothesis Ha as shown in Fig.3a. 
The critical P-value is calculated at given level of significance () and 
degree of freedom (d.f). To illustrate the operation of the algorithm 
we have chosen the standard value of =5% (i.e. a confidence 
interval of 95%). The d.f is the number of classes of Xi (i.e. the 
number of groups in which the frequency of RREQ is divided) being 
tested which is in our case is determined by the testing module of 
AIDP for each TI at run time. If calculated chi-computed value is 
larger than the critical value then we reject Ho ,and assume intrusion 
in the TI. We then use intruder-identification task (Fig.3b) to identify 
the individual intruding node. This uses variable control chart based 
on standard deviation . We calculate  of RREQ generated by all 
nodes then set the CL=, UCL=CL + 3& LCL= minimum [0 , CL - 
3 ]. We choose 3 limits because we know that for a normal 
distribution 99.7% of the observation lies within + 3 limits.  We 
consider node 
 to be a detected intruder if it initiates more RREQs 
than the UCL, in which case we add node 
 to the potential intruder 
list (PIL) maintained by CH. If any node 
 is detected more than
Figure 1. Time-based operation of AIDP. 
Figure 3. Pseudocode of testing module. 
(1) 
Figure 2. Pseudocode of training module. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 d times in P intervals (the threshold for accusation 
Detection_to_Accuse) then the CH blacklists the node and inform 
all other CNs by sending an accusation packet (AP).   
       When a CN receives an AP it first checks the broadcast id & 
source address to avoid processing a duplicate AP. If the accused 
node is already blacklisted the CN will ignore & drop the AP to 
prevent unnecessary network traffic. Otherwise, the CN will 
blacklist the accused node and rebroadcast the AP.  Finally, to 
isolate the intruder form the network all nodes will not only drop 
the packets from a blacklisted node but also immediately ignore all 
packets in their queue from the blacklisted nodes as shown in 
Fig.3d. If no intrusion is detected by the chi-square test (Fig.3a) 
then we updates the training profile using an exponentially 
weighted moving average (EWMA) as given in equation 2, 
                 ( ) ( ) ( )1 11
, 1,
,
(1 )k kkJ I J I
J I
X X Xα α −= ∗ + − ∗       (2) 
where
1( , )
k
J IX  and 
1( , )
k
J I
X  represents the expected and observed 
value for update period number (J) respectively. The value of J is 
incremented in the TI when no intrusion in the MANET is 
detected. I represent the random variable from 1 to k 
and 2
( 1)J
α =
−
 is the weighting factor. As J increases the 
weighting for older data points decreases exponentially giving 
more importance to the current observation. The updated expected 
profile model reflects the current behaviour of the network. This is 
important for adaptive ID in MANET where overall behaviour of 
the network changes with time. 
5. EVALUATION  
5.1 Simulation Environment  
        We use GloMoSim to assess the performance of AIDP. We 
build the simulation environment by assuming that the MAC and 
Physical layer are reliable in their operations. Table 1 shows the 
simulation parameters for all scenarios. The nodes are initially 
placed at the start of simulation in a rectangular grid. The terrain 
dimension values in Table 1 ensure node density is constant 
between all three scenarios. We assume a single cluster in our 
simulations, and we use the random way point (RWP) as mobility 
model. 
5.2 Assessment of control chart as an 
Intrusion Detector 
In first set of experiments we use only control chart based on
standard deviation  to detect DoS. The CH monitors the network 
for a TI and then applies control chart based on  on the number of  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Table 1. Simulation Parameters 
Number of nodes 25 49 64 
Terrain dimensions  400*400 m 560*560 m 640*640 m 
Number of intruders 1 or 2 
Node placement Grid with grid unit=10 metres 
Time interval TI 100 seconds 
Simulation time Training + Testing =500+2000=2500 seconds 
Routing protocol AODV 
MAC protocol IEEE 802.11 
Mobility Random Way Point Model (RWP) 
Pause time Varies from 10 to 60 seconds  
Mean speed Varies from 2 to 20 m/s 
       
RREQs generated by all nodes. The CH calculates the CL, UCL & 
LCL (Fig.3b). The CH will detect as intruder any node Vi that 
generates more RREQ than the UCL. This process is repeated by 
the CH for each TI. We perform 20 runs first with normal traffic 
(i.e. no intrusion in the network) and then a further 20 runs with 
one intruder picked randomly from the nodes. This intruder 
launches MRF attacks in order to cause DoS by sleep deprivation 
and rushing attack. Simulation with 25 , 49 & 64 nodes results in 
an average successful identification rate of 70%, but also has a 
very high average false alarm rate (i.e. detecting a node as an 
intruder when there is no intrusion in the network ) of 55%. 
 
5.3 Evaluation of AIDP  
In this section we present the results from AIDP.  We 
experimented with all three scenarios (25, 49&64 nodes) using the 
parameters of Table 1.  
      By introducing the chi-square test in addition to control chart 
the individual identification rate rises to 86% and the false alarm 
rate drops to 15% for a test in a single TI. This significantly 
improves the detection rate.     
      In simulation for AIDP the CH applies the training module 
(Fig.2) for N=5 TI, and then applies the testing module (Fig.3) for 
20 TI each of 100 seconds.  We illustrate results here with TSW=5 
and Detection_to_Accuse=3. We perform 20 runs with each 
scenario (25, 49 & 64 nodes) with normal traffic using the 
simulation parameters of Table 1 and then with intruders picked 
randomly from the nodes. These intruders launch MRF 1 & 2 
attacks in order to cause DoS by sleep deprivation and rushing 
attack. At each tested mean speed we perform 20 runs with no 
intruders and 20 runs with one intruder using MRF1 and 20 runs 
with on intruder using MRF2.                      
             
Figure 4. Success and false alarm rate as a function of node mean speed in a 25, 49 & 64 nodes network. 
DoS attack through MRF 1 & 2 (25 nodes network)
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Fig. 4 depict the success rate (SR) and false alarm (FA) rate of 
AIDP as a function of the nodes’ mean speed in 25 ,49 & 64 node 
networks .By SR here we mean the rate of correctly indicating 
intrusion in the network and then identifying & isolating the node 
which is causing DoS. A false alarm (FA) means that a correctly 
behaving node has been incorrectly identified and isolated. When 
there is no intrusion in the network the FA are zero in all three 
scenarios. The graphs show good performance of AIDP in terms of 
high SR and very low FA rate against DoS attacks through MRF 1 
& 2. The SR drops slightly in the 64 node network when the nodes 
are moving with a higher mean speed.                                       
Effects on network performance  
To analyze the performance impact of AIDP on the network we 
monitor control & data packets during our simulations. Fig 5 
depicts the control packet overhead as functions of increasing 
mean node speed in 25, 49 & 64 nodes network. By control packet 
overhead we mean the ratio of the number of control packets to the 
delivered data packets during the simulations. Each graph displays 
the control packet overhead when there is a) no DoS attack in the 
network b) intrusion in the network (DoS attack) but no means of 
defending these attacks, and c) intrusion (DoS attacks) with AIDP 
in place to protect the network . As can be seen from the graphs 
AIDP reduces the control packet overhead & conversely increases 
the network throughput when it is used in a network under attack 
by intruder causing DoS. However, the control packet overhead is 
not as low as that of a network when there is no intrusion because 
AIDP also needs control packets for IDP in the network. 
CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK 
The on-demand nature of MANET routing protocols makes them 
susceptible to DoS attacks, such as sleep deprivation and rushing 
attack. In this paper we have illustrated how intruders can cause 
DoS attacks in MANETs. We consider the suitability of using only 
control chart to protect against these attacks, and demonstrated that 
this method based on static threshold similar that proposed in [8] 
& [9] is not suitable because it does not cope well with the 
dynamics of MANETs. We then proposed an adaptive intrusion 
detection & prevention mechanism AIDP. It employs ABID which 
first use chi-square test to check the overall behaviour of the 
network and indicate intrusion, and then uses control chart to 
identify intruding nodes. Finally we isolate the intruding nodes.             
       Simulation results show that AIDP successfully detects 
identifies & isolates the intruding nodes attempting to cause DoS 
attacks. AIDP exhibits a high success rate and very low false alarm 
rate with an affordable processing overhead on the network over a 
range of scenarios tested.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In our ongoing work we are focusing on generalizing AIDP by 
including other related parameters to cover all routing attacks in 
MANET. 
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Figure 5. Control packet overhead Vs nodes mean speed in a 25, 49 & 64 nodes network. 
